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ABSTRACT
Packet manipulation attack is one of the challenging threats in cyber-physical systems (CPSs) and Internet of
Things (IoT), where information packets are corrupted during transmission by compromised devices. These attacks
consume network resources, result in delays in decision making, and could potentially lead to triggering wrong
actions that disrupt an overall system’s operation. Such malicious attacks as well as unintentional faults are difficult
to locate/identify in a large-scale mesh-like multihop network, which is the typical topology suggested by most IoT
standards. In this paper, first, we propose a novel network architecture that utilizes powerful nodes that can support
two distinct communication link technologies for identification of malicious networked devices (with typical single-
link technology). Such powerful nodes equipped with dual-link technologies can reveal hidden information within
meshed connections that is hard to otherwise detect. By applying machine intelligence at the dual-link nodes,
malicious networked devices in an IoT network can be accurately identified. Second, we propose two techniques
based on unsupervised machine learning, namely hard detection and soft detection, that enable dual-link nodes to
identify malicious networked devices. Our techniques exploit network diversity as well as the statistical information
computed by dual-link nodes to identify the trustworthiness of resource-constrained devices. Simulation results
show that the detection accuracy of our algorithms is superior to the conventional watchdog scheme, where nodes
passively listen to neighboring transmissions to detect corrupted packets. The results also show that as the density
of the dual-link nodes increases, the detection accuracy improves and the false alarm rate decreases.
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1 INTRODUCTION
An IoT network typically consists of: (i) a large number
of simple devices (like sensors and actuators) in the
This paper is accepted at the International Workshop on Very
Large Internet of Things (VLIoT 2018) in conjunction with the
VLDB 2018 Conference in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The proceedings
of VLIoT@VLDB 2018 are published in the Open Journal of
Internet of Things (OJIOT) as special issue.
cyber-physical domain that are connected to collect
and exchange information about the physical system;
(ii) higher-level powerful devices in the cyber domain
(like control units) that gather information and make
decisions to trigger actions in the system. Distant
and power-constrained IoT devices generally exchange
information over multiple hops to reach to high-level
controllers, constituting a multihop mesh network. The
mesh topology is a flexible topology that allows any
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device to communicate with any other device within its
communication range, and communications to a distant
receiver can be over multiple hops of transmissions.
Mesh topology is adopted by many IoT protocols,
such as Insteon smart home, Z-Wave, Thread and
ZigBee/IEEE 802.15.4 [1][2].
However, with the increased heterogeneity and
connectivity, IoT-enabled systems are vulnerable to
various security threats. The risks of internal attacks
launched by authenticated, yet compromised, devices
increase. Devices in an IoT system could get
compromised through: (i) malicious remote access over
the Internet (e.g. Mirai malware [3]); (ii) malicious
access to the local network (e.g. Stuxnet attack [4]);
(iii) malicious physical access, especially for devices in
public areas such as in smart parking infrastructures,
hotels, and healthcare centers. Internal attacks launched
by compromised devices could not be resolved by
traditional cryptographic methods. Novel protocols
and supporting architectures are needed to ensure the
security of IoT systems and improve their ability to
recover from attacks. Attack detection and system
recovery are among the primary elements of NIST
cybersecurity framework [5].
This paper focuses on packet manipulation attacks
[6], which is one of the most challenging internal
threats in IoT. In this attack, a compromised node along
a multihop path manipulates the received information
(arbitrarily or into malicious contents) before it forwards
it to the destination1. Manipulation attacks consume
network resources by having networked elements
transmit/forward corrupted information; they also result
in delays in decision making and could potentially lead
to triggering wrong actions that disrupt the physical
environment. For instance, in a healthcare application,
if packets containing personal health information are
manipulated by a malicious relay node, delayed,
wrong or even fatal treatment decisions could be
made. Similarly, manipulating information/commands
sent from/to security cameras, door locks, and many
other IoT elements could cause serious consequences.
Malicious packet manipulation should be detected,
and nodes engaged in this activity should be identified
and then removed or fixed. In a multihop network,
end-to-end packet integrity checks with cryptographic
hashes can detect packet manipulation at the destination
(sink-node or gateway). Such a detection of the
existence of packet manipulation would however fail
to identify which nodes are malicious in a multi-hop
transmission, since any of the relay nodes may have
1 Note that malfunctioning nodes could accidentally corrupt packets;
hence, these nodes can also be regarded as unreliable/malicious.
In the scope of this paper, any packet manipulation is regarded as
malicious.
corrupted the packet. One approach to identifying the
malicious nodes is for neighboring nodes to passively
listen to transmissions and identify manipulations or
packet drops. This is known by the watchdog scheme
[7]. However, it implies that all nodes have to
be awake and also maintain state, at least for the
immediately transmitted packets. They also have
to communicate their counts of potentially corrupted
transmissions to the destination. The problem gets
worse as the transmission paths get longer (i.e., the
number of hops between the source and the destination
increases). Towards solving this problem, in this paper,
we propose a novel hierarchical network architecture
design that utilizes two communication link technologies
with distinct characteristics to facilitate inference about
the trustworthiness of nodes in the network. Then,
based on the dual-link enabled architecture, we design
machine learning algorithms that can effectively identify
malicious nodes. There are two broad contributions in
this paper:
First, we propose a hierarchical and heterogeneous
architecture that deploys trusted powerful nodes
supporting dual-link (DL) technologies, referred to
as DL nodes, and conventional less powerful nodes
supporting a single-link (SL) technology, referred
to as SL nodes. SL nodes are traditional sensors or
actuators, each of which is equipped with single short-
range communication interface (e.g. IEEE 802.15.4
[2]), while each of the DL nodes is equipped with
long-range (LoRa) link interface [8] and short-range
interface. LoRa has been recently developed targeting
IoT applications. In contrast to short-range technologies,
LoRa links form a star topology that can cover an entire
city with a single hop, at the expense of significantly
lowering the data rates. In this architecture, DL nodes
use their short-range links to communicate with SL
nodes, and use LoRa links to communicate with a
centralized LoRa gateway (center of the star topology).
The objective of DL nodes is to evaluate the
trustworthiness of SL nodes in the system. Hence,
they can identify suspicious SL nodes and facilitate
network recovery from attacks. To evaluate the behavior
of SL nodes, DL nodes periodically exchange probe
messages over their short-range links. Probe messages
are propagated through multihop transmissions by SL
nodes over diverse multihop network paths. By checking
the integrity of packets received from each path, DL
nodes compute a reputation metric of each path and a
contribution metric (trustworthiness level) of each SL
node along a path. The contribution metric is then
used as feature to identify the node’s behavior using
K-means clustering. The distributed DL nodes make
the feature calculations (trustworthiness of nodes) more
accurate and the malicious node identification process
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more effective. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to utilize dual link technologies to identify malicious
nodes for network security.
Second, we propose two methods for identifying
malicious nodes, namely hard detection (HD) and
soft detection (SD). Our approaches are based on
unsupervised learning and utilizing the network diversity
in different portions of the network. We proposed an
earlier versions of these techniques in [9]. Here, we
apply them in the hierarchical architecture supporting
dual link technologies. Both techniques are based on
K-means clustering. In HD, nodes are clustered into
malicious or benign groups based on their contribution
levels extracted at the DL nodes. In SD, nodes are
clustered into three groups based on their contribution
levels, then highly suspicious nodes (with very low
contribution levels) are discarded and more accurate
contribution feature is computed for each of the
remaining nodes, provided that there is sufficient
network diversity; without sufficient diversity, HD is
applied instead. Unlike existing machine learning-based
anomaly detection approaches that assume single-hop
communication with a trusted device, such as in [10],
or detect multihop attacks without identifying attackers,
such as in [11], our approaches can identify malicious
nodes along multihop network paths.
Our simulation results show that our approaches
achieve high detection accuracy under different
percentages of malicious nodes and under variable
attack levels (attack probabilities) within the network.
We examined the accuracy with and without channel
errors. We compared our approaches with the well-
known watchdog method for malicious node detection
[7]. The results show that the detection accuracy of the
approaches is superior to that of the existing watchdog
method, and the gains increase as the percentage of
malicious nodes increases. The results also show that
as the density of the DL nodes increases, the detection
accuracy improves and the false alarm rate decreases.
The reason is that as the density of the DL nodes
increases, shorter transmission paths to a DL node can
be used, which enable the DL nodes to compute more
accurate statistics. The long range communications
here ensure that the identification results will not be
manipulated in transit as it is being sent to a high level
network controller (gateway) in a single hop.
2 RELATED WORK
There are several existing techniques for detecting
malicious nodes sending falsified or manipulated data
in a network. In [12], an en-route filtering scheme is
provided to filter false data injected by malicious nodes,
where polynomials are adopted for data verification. The
presented technique can detect the existence of malicious
behavior in the network, but does not identify malicious
nodes. A distributed detection in a centralized single
hop network is considered in [13], where nodes sending
falsified information to the centralized entity are detected
through hard fusion rule. However, strictly centralized
communication may not be available in many IoT
systems with resource-constrained devices, especially
as the required information rate increases. A wireless
ad hoc network is considered in [14], which employs
a trusted node that uses control packets, collision and
channel error rates to estimate the number of packets
that are maliciously dropped by its one-hop neighbors.
This approach can be applied to estimate the number of
maliciously manipulated packets over one hop, but could
not identify malicious nodes along a multihop routing
path. In [15][16], we utilized the network diversity to
identify malicious relay nodes in a mesh network. The
scheme requires large overhead information to be added
to each packet, and can provide high accuracy under the
assumption that there is at least one reliable path between
the source and the destination. In this paper, we consider
more general attack model and the proposed techniques
reduce the amount of traffic overhead needed to identify
malicious nodes.
In [7], the well-known watchdog scheme is used
to identify nodes that maliciously drop packets in a
multihop network. Watchdog technique relies on having
every node overhear packets forwarded by neighboring
nodes, and accordingly verifies whether packets were
dropped. Then, nodes report to a trusted centralized
entity (collector) their opinion about their neighbors’
behavior. The collector uses majority voting to identify
malicious nodes. The watchdog scheme can also be
applied to identifying malicious nodes that manipulate
packets, but it would require extra energy, computational
and memory resources at each node to overhear all their
neighbors’ packets and evaluate their trustworthiness. In
[6], a malicious node detection scheme in a tree-shaped
wireless sensor network is proposed, where a sink
(root of the tree) counts the percentages of manipulated
packets along each path and utilizes nodes’ relative
position information for malicious node identification.
Here, encryption is required at each node for both
generating and forwarding each packet, and hence may
not be supported by many of the resource-constrained
IoT devices.
Machine learning methods are widely applied for
detecting network attacks and malicious nodes. In
[17], bandwidth and hop counts of multiple packets
from a source to a destination are used as features
to train a one-class support vector machine (SVM)
classifier; the SVM classifier is then used to predict
the existence of attacks. The scheme presented in [18]
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uses cross-layer features for training the SVM, which
is assisted by Fisher Discriminant Analysis machine
learning technique, to detect the existence of malicious
behavior. Yet, malicious nodes that launched these
attacks were not identified. In a multihop environmental
monitoring network in [19], sensor’s confidence factor
is defined, which is based on the node’s communication
quality with its one-hop neighboring sensors; all nodes’
confidence factors are collected at a control unit to train
a neural network and predict data samples generated by
sensor nodes, then detect anomalies. That is, if an actual
data sample from certain sensor node is significantly
different from the predicted data, the corresponding node
is identified as faulty/malicious. In [20], Bayesian Belief
Network is employed to detect outliers in a centralized
network, where data is sent directly over a single hop
from sensor nodes to a control unit. Both techniques in
[19] and [20] rely on having each node benignly report
reliable control information to a central unit, which
cannot be guaranteed if some nodes are compromised.
In [10], many trusted nodes are deployed in a network
to have single-hop communications with ordinary nodes
and send related statistical information to a control unit
via secure channels, which then uses SVM to identify
malicious nodes. This approach could be impractical due
to the very high density of trusted nodes. In other words,
it is hard to guarantee that in a mesh multihop network,
each node is one-hop away from a trusted entity.
The limitation of the aforementioned techniques that
are based on supervised machine learning methods is
that labeling the training data can be expensive [21] or
can be improperly made [22]. Unsupervised learning
overcomes this problem. In [23], the unsupervised K-
means machine learning method is utilized to predict
anomalies. In [11], authors used a discrete time-
sliding window to continuously update the feature
space and an unsupervised incremental grid clustering
method to identify network abnormal flows. Yet,
approaches in [11][23] mainly detect abnormal flows,
but do not identify compromised nodes that caused these
abnormalities.
The architecture and algorithms proposed in this
paper enable the identification of malicious nodes in
large-scale mesh networks. With existing approaches,
data collected at end-devices (servers, controllers or
the cloud) carries little information about the reliability
of each element along the network transmission paths.
Hence, it is very hard to identify what went wrong within
hidden (meshed) network connections. We develop a
hierarchical architecture, where machine intelligence is
applied at distributed powerful entities to accurately
identify malicious nodes. The proposed architecture is
described in Section 3, and the proposed malicious node
identification schemes are presented in Sections 4 and 5.
3 SYSTEM MODEL: PROPOSED
HIERARCHICAL NETWORK
ARCHITECTURE WITH DUAL LINK
TECHNOLOGIES
In this section, we present the architecture that utilizes
dual link technologies to secure IoT networks. The
main network elements are described, and then, the
architecture and network operations that are followed
to validate the trustworthiness of network nodes are
explained. Finally, the attack model assumed in the rest
of this paper is presented. Such a dual-link enabled
architecture can be applied to many IoT applications
to identify faults and malicious nodes within a system
or between interacting systems (such as smart homes,
healthcare facilities, and energy grid).
3.1 Network Elements: Dual-Link and Single-
Link Nodes
We assume that the IoT network is composed
of resource-constrained single-link sensors/actuators,
called SL nodes, deployed in large numbers. Each
SL node is equipped with a single short-range link
interface (e.g., IEEE 802.15.4) supporting higher rate
multi-hop transmission. More powerful nodes equipped
with dual-link interfaces (DL nodes) have both long-
range (e.g., LoRa) and short-range interfaces. The LoRa
link at DL nodes allows the exchange of low data rate
information over long distances (spanning many hops of
the SL nodes). DL nodes are assumed to be trusted and
communicate with a LoRa gateway in a single hop using
the LoRa interface.
Both the DL and SL nodes are uniformly distributed
in the network. However, the density of DL nodes is
much lower than that of SL nodes. In particular, let the
number of DL nodes be NDL and the number of SL
nodes be NSL, then NSL  NDL. The main function
of the DL nodes is to untangle hidden information in
the mesh network and evaluate the trustworthiness of
SL nodes. By utilizing network diversity, each DL
node can compute a contribution metric (trustworthiness
level) of each SL node within a predefined network
region. The contribution metric is then used as
input to an unsupervised machine learning algorithm
to identify malicious SL nodes in the corresponding
network region. The machine learning algorithms for
identification of compromised SL nodes (Hard Detection
and Soft Detection) are described in detail in Sections 4
and 5. The information related to identification tasks is
then communicated from DL nodes to the LoRa gateway
through the LoRa link. The LoRa gateway gathers
information about the behavior of nodes in the entire
network. Depending on the computational resources at
the DL nodes, the gateway may assist in the computing
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Figure 1: Large-scale network with trusted DL nodes
tasks as will be described in Section 6.
3.2 Overview of Operational Process in the
Hierarchical Architecture
Consider a large-scale network shown in Fig. 1,
where DL and SL nodes are uniformly distributed and
DL nodes communicate with a LoRa gateway over a
single hop. The j-th DL node is denoted as Rj .
The identities of DL nodes (R1, R2, ..., RNDL) are
revealed to each other only, and secret cryptographic
keys are shared among them. The DL nodes divide
the large-scale network into virtual small-scale network
portions/regions. A region is a part of the network that
includes a mesh of SL nodes and is confined by DL nodes
at its farthest ends, as shown in Fig. 1. Define Region
Rj − Rk as a network region confined by the pair of
neighboring DL nodes Rj and Rk.
To evaluate the trustworthiness of SL nodes, DL nodes
periodically exchange probe packets at random time
intervals over their short-range links. Probe packets are
routed through SL nodes in the corresponding region.
Paths in each region are obtained using a typical route
establishment phase, which allows DL nodes to gather
information about the network topology. The probe
packets are flooded in each region (i.e., transmitted over
many transmission paths in that region) to validate the
integrity of intermediate SL nodes. We note that flooding
in packet routing is used in some IoT protocols for
local or personal area networks, such as Z-Wave and
Bluetooth mesh. In this paper, flooding is made over
a network region and not over the entire network to
minimize the traffic. We assume that DL nodes can get
information about the route taken by each probe packet
they receive.
When a DL node receives probe packets from diverse
routing paths within a region, it examines these packets
and evaluates a contribution metric (trustworthiness
level) for each SL node that assisted in relaying the
packet. The contribution metric is then used as the
feature for identifying compromised SL nodes, as will
be described in Section 4. Note that other than probe
packets, transmission of a packet over the network can be
over a single routing path (e.g. using ad-hoc on-demand
distance vector routing). In this case, DL nodes may also
act as intermediate check-points that monitor general
features about the traffic to detect anomalies. However,
in this paper we focus only on identifying malicious SL
nodes using the probe packets.
3.3 Attack Model
We assume that (the few) DL nodes are trusted (and
can be perhaps manually audited), while (the many)
SL nodes are simple resource-constrained devices that
could get compromised. In this paper, we will focus
on manipulation attacks, where a compromised device
manipulates a packet before it forwards it through
multiple hops towards the destination. The attack
model is assumed to be static, where a malicious
node manipulates each packet it forwards by a fixed
probability. A malicious node’s behavior is independent
of the routing path. This assumption is reasonable as
the resource constrained nodes are unlikely to have the
ability to respond intelligently to detection approaches
even when compromised.
Let Ri be an SL node, and define αi as a binary flag
to express whether Ri is benign. If Ri is a malicious
node, it manipulates each packet it forwards by a fixed
probability Pi. P¯i = 1 − Pi is the probability that
a forwarded packet will not be manipulated. If Ri is
benign, then Pi = 0. That is,
αi =
{
1, if Ri is benign, Pi = 0,
0, if Ri is malicious, 0 < Pi < 1.
(1)
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Table 1: Notations
Rj j-th DL node in large-scale network
S Source for a region
D Destination for a region
N Total number of SL nodes in a region
Ri i-th SL node in a region
Pi Attack probability of i-th SL node in a
region
li i-th path in a region
T Path reputation value set for a region
Ti i-th path’s reputation value in a region
C Node contribution value set for a region
Ci i-th node’s contribution value in a region
G(X)B Benign node set for a region by X
algorithm (X can be HD, SD, ESD)
G(X)M Malicious node set for a region by X
algorithm (X can be HD, SD, ESD)
Table 2: Abbreviations
DL node A DL node has dual communication links,
is more powerful and trusted
SL node A SL node has single communication link,
is less powerful and can get compromised
HD Hard Detection algorithm
SD Soft Detection algorithm
ESD Enhanced Soft Detection algorithm
4 SMALL-SCALE NETWORK MODEL AND
HARD DETECTION
Now, we describe the malicious node identification
methods that are carried out in each network region.
In this section, first we define the contribution feature
through which the nodes are clustered, then present
the hard detection (HD) malicious node identification
scheme (the soft detection scheme will be explained
in Section 5). The algorithms are based on K-means
clustering. Important notations and abbreviations are
listed in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. We focus on
a single Region Rj −Rk where Rj acts as the source S
and Rk acts as the destination D in this region. Analysis
can be applied to each region in a similar manner. Denote
N as the total number of SL nodes assisting the multihop
packet transmissions between S and D. Let Ri, i ∈
[1, N ] be the i-th SL node in the small-scale network
between S and D. In general, there could be multiple
available routing paths from S to D and each path may
contain different number of relay nodes (SL nodes).
Each node (including S andD) has a short-range RF link
with communication range of radius r. S sends probe
packets over multiple joint routing paths to D. That is,
R4
R1
S D
R5
R2 R3
Figure 2: A mesh-like multihop network example
with different path lengths
when S sends one probe packet, D can receive a copy
of this packet from each of the available paths. In this
section, we assume no channel errors. We will discuss
how to involve channel errors in the next section.
4.1 Path Reputation and Node Contribution
The goal here is to identify malicious nodes within
a network region. For this purpose, we calculate
path reputation metric and node contribution levels
(trustworthiness). At the destination DL node D in a
network region, among all the received probe packets
along a certain path, there could be some packets
manipulated by compromised nodes. D estimates
the number and percentage of (un)manipulated packets
along each path by checking the integrity2 of each
received packet using a keyed hash function. The higher
the percentage of correctly received packets is, the higher
the reputation the corresponding path has for delivering
packets. Thus, we define a path’s reputation as the
number of correctly received packets going through a
path divided by the number of all packets transmitted
through it. Let all the L paths in a network region be
in the path set L = {li}, i ∈ [1, L]. Each li represents a
possible S-D path, i.e., group of relay nodes that forward
packets between S and D. For example, in Fig. 2, the
path “R1 −R2 −R3” is represented as li = {1, 2, 3}.
The reputation value of path li is denoted by Tli . High
Tli indicates that more packets along li were received
correctly. We can then quantify each node’s contribution
to a path’s reputation. Let’s consider the mesh-like
multihop network in Fig. 2 as an example, where there
are total of five relay nodes and multiple possible paths
between S and D. We assume that R1, R2 and R5
are malicious nodes (marked in yellow color). Each
available direct communication link is denoted by an
arrow. Define Mli as the set of manipulated packets
along the path li and M¯li as the set of correctly received
packets. First, let’s focus on path “R1-R2-R3”, through
which S sends Q probe packets. M1,2,3 is the set of
2 To achieve the integrity check, each packet at S contains a message
concatenated with a corresponding hash value;D checks the integrity
using a cryptographic keyed hash function where the key is shared by
S and D.
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the manipulated packets along this path (“R1-R2-R3”),
E[|M1,2,3|] is the expected number of manipulated
packets and E[|M¯1,2,3|] is the expected number of
correctly received packets. Recall the attack model in
Section 3.3 that Ri manipulates packets with probability
Pi; then E[|M¯1,2,3|] = P¯3P¯2P¯1Q. Therefore, the
expected reputation of path “R1-R2-R3” becomes
T¯1,2,3 = E[|M¯1,2,3|]/Q = P¯3P¯2P¯1 =
|{1,2,3}|∏
i=1
P¯i. (2)
Tlj is the estimate of T¯lj obtained by sufficiently
large number of probe packets. We denote the i-
th node’s contribution to Tlj as C
lj
i . It indicates
how Ri contributes to the reputation of path lj by
benignly forwarding packets, i.e., Clji represents the
trustworthiness of Ri along path lj . For each path
lj , since there is no prior information about Pi, our
approach is to initially assume that each node has equal
contribution to the reputation of its path. From Eq. (2),
the equality is expressed by Tlj = (C
lj
i )
|lj |. That is,
C
lj
i =
|lj |
√
Tlj . For example, in Fig. 2, for path “R1-
R2-R3”, the contribution value at each node is C
1,2,3
i =
3
√
T1,2,3, i = 1, 2, 3. Since each node is associated
with multiple paths, node’s contribution value in other
paths should also be taken into account. Let the node
Ri be associated with a total of ki paths, and ki,j , j ∈
{1, ..., ki} is the j-th path among these ki paths. Path
ki,j contains |ki,j | relay nodes. The reputation of path
ki,j is denoted as Ti,j . Then Ri’s overall contribution
value is calculated as
Ci =
1
ki
ki∑
j=1
|ki,j |
√
Ti,j . (3)
For example, in Fig. 2, R1 is associated with a total of
k1 = 3 paths. k1,1 = {1, 2, 3} (|k1,1| = 3) denotes the
path “R1-R2-R3”, k1,2 = {1, 5} (|k1,2| = 2) denotes
the path “R1-R5” and k1,3 = {1, 5, 3} (|k1,3| = 3)
denotes the path “R1-R5-R3”. R1’s contribution values
in k1,2 and k1,3 are C
1,5
1 =
2
√
T1,5, C
1,5,3
1 =
3
√
T1,5,3,
respectively. R1’s overall contribution value is the
average ofR1’s contribution values in its three associated
paths, which is expressed as C1 = ( 3
√
T1,2,3 + 2
√
T1,5 +
3
√
T1,5,3)/3.
4.2 Hard Detection
Generally, if the attack probability ofRi (Pi) is relatively
high, i.e., Ri manipulates packets going through it with
high probability, then Ri’s associated path reputations
are relatively low and its contribution value Ci will also
be low. On the contrary, benign nodes (with Pi '
Algorithm 1 Hard Detection: HD(C, ε,L)
1: Input dataset C, threshold ε, path set L;
2: if C = 1¯ then
3: G(HD)B = {1, ..., N}, G(HD)M = ∅;
4: else if T˜ < ε then
5: G(HD)M = {1, ..., N}, G(HD)B = ∅;
6: else
7: Use K-means(C,2) to cluster C into 2 groups.
The group with higher data values is G(HD)B ; the
other group is G(HD)M ;
8: end if
9: Output benign node set:G(HD)B ; malicious node
set:G(HD)M .
0) will have relatively high contribution values. The
contribution value/metric is used as feature to classify
nodes’ behavior. We utilize the K-means clustering
algorithm, which can cluster nodes into multiple
groups according to their similarity [24]. Denote the
contribution dataset as C = {Ci}, i ∈ {1, ..., N}. K-
means method clusters the nodes in two groups; nodes
with similar contribution values are clustered in the same
group. The group of nodes with higher contribution
values is identified as the benign node set G(HD)B and
the other group becomes the malicious node set G(HD)M .
We call this algorithm Hard Detection (HD) as nodes are
classified into two groups. The steps of this algorithm
are described in Algorithm 13.
Note that there are two special cases before applying
the K-means method: First, if all the nodes are benign,
then all the path reputations are high (equal to 1) and
each node’s overall contribution value is 1; in this case,
we identify all nodes as benign. Second, if all nodes
are malicious, most paths’ reputation values will be very
low (close to 0). In our approach, if the average of
all paths’ reputation values is less than a threshold ε (a
small value), then all nodes are identified as malicious.
The average path reputation value is calculated as T˜ =
1
L
∑L
i=1 Tli .
5 SOFT DETECTION AND CHANNEL ERRORS
5.1 Soft Detection
As explained in the previous section, nodes with
relatively high Pi are expected to have relatively low
contribution values, and nodes with Pi = 0 (benign
nodes) are expected to have high contribution values.
However, benign nodes with low Pi may have their
3 Note that K-means(A, n) refers to clustering elements in the dataset
A into n groups.
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Algorithm 2 Path Set Update: PSU(L,G13)
1: Input path set L, node set G13 , i = 1;
2: while i 6 L do
3: if G13 ∩ li 6= ∅ then
4: L ← L \ li;
5: end if
6: i← i+ 1;
7: end while
8: Output updated L.
estimated contribution values at an intermediate level.
The reason is that a node’s contribution is influenced
by the behavior of other nodes along its associated
multihop path(s). In K-means clustering withK=2, these
intermediate levels will still be assigned to either benign
or malicious, resulting in misdetection (malicious nodes
identified as benign) and false alarms (benign nodes
identified as malicious).
To solve this problem, we propose soft detection,
where we cluster nodes into three groups, instead of
two. The three clusters represent high, medium and
low contribution values. Here, we identify the highly
suspicious group (nodes with high Pi) as malicious first
and then identify other nodes. The corresponding node
sets to the high, medium, low contribution values are
denoted as G11 , G12 and G13 , respectively. All nodes
in G13 are identified as malicious. However, we do
not directly identify nodes in G11 as benign and G12
as malicious (with low Pi) since their contribution
values can be calculated very inaccurately when nodes
in G13 are involved. Hence, we try to refine the
feature (contribution value) calculations by removing
nodes in G13 from the computations whenever possible
(this is done by not including their related paths when
calculating contribution values).
More specifically, our approach first records the
original path set L0 and contribution set C0 as L0 =
L, C0 = C. Then, it excludes from the path set L
any path that contains any of the nodes in G13 . That
way, L is updated. The steps to launch the path set
update are elaborated in Algorithm 2 (Path Set Update
(PSU)). After updating the path set L, we recalculate
the contribution set C for the remaining (unidentified)
node set GU , G11 ∪ G12 . Then, we apply K-means(C,2)
to cluster nodes in GU into two sets: G21 and G22 . The
nodes with higher contribution values (G21 ) are classified
as benign, while others (G22 ) are classified as malicious.
We describe the soft detection approach in Algorithm 3.
Condition 1: Our approach for malicious node
identification depends on sufficient network diversity
to calculate accurate nodes’ contribution values
(trustworthiness). After path set update, nodes in GU
R4
R1
S D
R5
R2 R3
R6
Figure 3: An example for ESD Algorithm
along with S and D form another graph topology
different from the original topology formed by all the
nodes. We define d˜U as the average node degree of
the graph formed by nodes in GU , S and D. If d˜U is
lower than a predefined threshold η, then the diversity
in the remaining topology is insufficient to evaluate
new contribution values. In this case, we apply the HD
algorithm to identify the behavior of nodes in GU . We
set η > 2 to ensure that every node is connected to
more than one path. For example, for the network in
Fig. 2, if G13={R1, R2}, then the updated L contains
two paths only, i.e., R4-R5-R3 and R4-R5, to form a
graph (that includes S and D). After discarding G13 , the
average node degree is d˜U=2. This expresses that an
intermediate node is connected to one path only (has
a link with a preceding node along a path and another
link with a succeeding node, hence its degree is 2).
Since d˜U 6 η, SD cannot be applied and HD is applied
instead. In some cases, the updated L may even contain
no paths after nodes in G13 are removed from the original
network topology; in these cases, we also apply HD
results to nodes in GU .
Condition 2: Even if d˜U > η, there may be some
nodes in GU not associated with any path in the updated
L. These nodes still remain unidentified after executing
(G21 ,G22) = HD(C, ε,L) (Line 14,15 in SD Algorithm,
i.e., Algorithm 3). In this case, the identification results
from HD (using the original topology as the input) are
applied to identify the behavior of these nodes.
5.2 Enhanced Soft Detection (ESD)
We propose an enhanced soft detection (ESD) algorithm,
which improves the detection accuracy of the SD
algorithm. In particular, we here utilize benign paths
(all nodes along them are benign) to correct misdetection
or false alarms of the SD algorithm. From our previous
discussions, one can infer the following: (i) if a path’s
reputation is 1, then nodes along this path do not
manipulate packets. In other words, all nodes along this
path are benign. Nodes satisfying such conditions are
classified into the benign node set G(ESD)B ; (ii) for a path
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Algorithm 3 Soft Detection: SD(C, ε, η,L)
1: Input dataset C, threshold ε, η, path set L;
2: if C = 1¯ then
3: G(SD)B = {1, ..., N}, G(SD)M = ∅;
4: else if T˜ < ε1 then
5: G(SD)M = {1, ..., N}, G(SD)B = ∅;
6: else
7: Use k-means(C,3) to cluster C into three groups
where the group with the lowest data values is the
malicious node set G13 ; the other two groups G11 and
G12 are considered as an unidentified node set GU ,
G11 ∪ G12 ;
8: L0 = L; C0 = C; (G0B ,G0M ) = HD(C0, ε,L0);
9: Update L = PSU(L,G13 ); Update C, T based on
L;
10: if (d˜U 6 η and C 6= 1¯) or |L| = 0 then
11: Apply the results from G0B ,G0M to nodes in
GU ;
12: Let G(SD)M be the union of G13 and malicious
nodes in GU , and the remaining nodes belong to
G(SD)B ;
13: else
14: (G21 ,G22)=HD(C, ε,L);
15: G(SD)M =G13 ∪ G22 ;G(SD)B =G21 ;
16: end if
17: end if
18: Output benign node set: G(SD)B ; malicious node set:
G(SD)M .
with reputation less than 1, if there is only one node
in this path not belonging to G(ESD)B , then that node is
malicious since it is the only possible node to manipulate
packets. Nodes satisfying such conditions are classified
into malicious node set G(ESD)M . For example, consider
the topology in Fig. 3, where R3, R4 and R6 are benign
and R1, R2 and R5 are malicious. D can observe that
the reputation of path “R4 − R6” is 1 and accordingly
infer that both R4 and R6 are benign. Hence, G(ESD)B =
{R4, R6}. Then , D can also observe that the reputation
of path “R4 − R5” is less than 1. Since R5 is the only
node in path “R4 −R5” not belonging to G(ESD)B , R5 is
identified as malicious and put into G(ESD)M . There are
no other paths satisfying inference (ii), so we identify
R1, R2, R3 using the results from SD Algorithm.
ESD Algorithm is executed after SD to improve the
detection accuracy. That is, if there is any identification
result conflict from SD and ESD to Ri, we accept the
result from ESD for Ri. Note that ESD algorithm can
also be used to improve the results from HD algorithm
in a similar way. The ESD algorithm is described in
Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Enhanced Soft Detection: ESD(L0)
1: Define U as the set containing all the nodes;
2: Input path set L0, node set G(ESD)B = G(ESD)M = ∅,
i = 1;
3: while i 6 L do
4: if Tli = 1 then
5: G(ESD)B ← G(ESD)B ∪ li;
6: end if
7: i← i+ 1;
8: end while
9: (G(ESD)B )C ← U − G(ESD)B , i = 1;
10: while i 6 L do
11: if Tli 6= 1 and |li ∩ (G(ESD)B )C | = 1 then
12: G(ESD)M ← G(ESD)M ∪ (li ∩ (G(ESD)B )C);
13: end if
14: i← i+ 1;
15: end while
16: Output benign node set: G(ESD)B and malicious node
set: G(ESD)M .
Algorithm 5 Reputation Correction (RC)
1: Input path set L, path reputation set T , i = 1;
2: while i 6 L do
3: Tli ← Tli/(µ¯(|li|+1));
4: if Tli > 1 then
5: Tli ← 1;
6: end if
7: i← i+ 1;
8: end while
5.3 Reputation Correction under Channel
Errors
In this subsection, we discuss the impact of channel
errors on the detection algorithms. We consider that
the channel packet error rate is the same for all
communication links, and is denoted by µ. Thus, the
rate of correct transmission per link is µ¯ = 1 − µ. µ
can be estimated by pilot or training packets. We can
follow a similar analysis in Section 4.1 to obtain nodes’
contribution values. For example, for the link S − R1,
where S sends Q packets to R1, the expected number of
correctly received packets is Qµ¯. Then, consider a path
of n hops, the expected path reputation is µ¯n
∏n−1
i=1 P¯i.
To cancel the effect of channel errors from the feature
computations, we divide by µ¯n. For example, the effect
of channel errors on T1,2,3 can be canceled by updating:
T1,2,3 ← T1,2,3/(µ¯4). Then all the updated reputation
values are utilized to calculate the nodes’ contributions
and then identify malicious nodes by the SD Algorithm
in a similar way.
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The above steps are illustrated in Algorithm 5. It
is also noted that if we input the corrected reputations
T into SD Algorithm (Algorithm 3), some minor
modifications are needed4. More specifically, “C = 1¯” in
Line 2 should be changed to “avg(C) > εRC” and “C 6=
1¯” in Line 10 should be changed to “avg(C) < εRC” to
tolerate the channel error effect. εRC is very close to 1
and “avg(C)” refers to the average value of elements in
set C. Note that µ¯n < 1. Due to possible estimation
errors, after updating Tli by canceling channel error
effects we may get Tli > 1, which is not reasonable.
In this case, we set Tli = 1.
6 INTERACTIONS AMONG SMALL-SCALE
NETWORKS VIA LORA
6.1 Information via LoRa Links
Recall our proposed network division mechanism in
Section 3. Rk is a trusted DL node, which acts as
the destination of probe packets for Region Rj − Rk.
According to Algorithm 1, 3, 4, Rk should check all
packets’ integrity, calculate T , C and apply K-means
machine learning method for clustering nodes’ behavior
based on contribution values. However, in case Rk
does not have sufficient computational resources, some
of these functions can be performed at the LoRa gateway.
As explained in Section 3, each DL node has
two communication interfaces, one of which is the
long-range LoRa link interface. Each DL node can
communicate with a distant LoRa gateway directly; the
LoRa gateway typically has high computational power,
and we assume it knows the network topology. There are
two possible cases for identification of malicious nodes:
• Case 1: the DL nodes have sufficient computational
power. In this case, each DL node computes
the nodes’ contribution values and executes K-
means to obtain the identification results for its
corresponding network region. Then, each DL node
delivers the identification results via LoRa links to
the LoRa gateway.
• Case 2: the DL nodes do not have sufficient
computational power. Hence, a DL node delivers
the reputation value set T (which is a short
message) via LoRa links to the LoRa gateway. The
gateway knows the network topology, and it can
compute the contribution set C and apply K-means
clustering to get the classification results.
Lastly, via LoRa links, the LoRa gateway notifies each
DL node to eliminate the malicious nodes from the
4 Note that ESD Algorithm is not applicable to situations under channel
errors since inference (i) in Section 4 would be incorrect with channel
errors.
routing paths. This notification can also be transmitted
by DL nodes through reliable paths of short-range links.
Remark 1: Some SL nodes can be involved in multiple
regions simultaneously. For example, in Fig. 4, an SL
node, denoted as Rs, is involved in Region R4 − R5
and R3 − R5. These two regions can have different
identification results for Rs. Our approach is to accept
the identification result of Rs from the region with the
highest average node degree. The reason is that higher
average node degree leads to higher diversity of paths in
a region, which helps in classifying Rs’s behavior more
accurately.
6.2 Path Selection
After malicious node identification, reliable multihop
paths (of short-range links) can be selected for
transmissions. Whenever a DL node receives a packet, it
attempts to forward it over the most reliable path. When
the packet source and destination are in distant regions,
DL nodes can select which (intermediate) regions a
packet will go through until it reaches its destination.
Here, we propose a strategy for path selection in the
large-scale network, where we consider each small-scale
region Rj − Rk as a “virtual node”; the highest path
reputation within this region is assigned to virtual node
as the virtual node contribution. Each DL node is also
considered as a virtual node; its virtual node contribution
value is 1 (since it is assumed to be trusted). As shown
in Fig. 5, these virtual nodes constitute various paths,
named “virtual paths”. For example, a virtual path
can be constituted by: R1, R1 − R3, R3, R3 − R5,
R5. From the analysis in Section 4.1, each virtual path
in Fig. 5 also has virtual path reputation, which is
obtained by multiplying the contribution values of virtual
nodes along this virtual path. In this way, virtual nodes
along the virtual path with the highest reputation can be
selected as the most reliable path for packet forwarding.
7 NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of
the architecture and evaluate the performance of the
malicious nodes identification techniques (HD and
SD). The ESD Algorithm is applied to both HD and
SD algorithms. We compare our methods with the
conventional watchdog scheme. We illustrate the effect
of the maximum number of hops, network diversity,
percentage of malicious nodes (in each small-scale
network) and the number of DL nodes (in a large-scale
network) on the detection accuracy. We show the impact
of the architecture that utilizes dual link technologies
(LoRa and short range RF) in improving the network
security by accurately identifying malicious nodes.
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Figure 4: Large-scale network with one SL node involved in two Regions
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Figure 5: Large-scale network with DL nodes in a virtual view
7.1 Simulation Setup and Performance in a
Single Region
In the simulation for small-scale networks, we assume
there are N single-link (SL) relay nodes uniformly
distributed in a (6N )×15m2 rectangular network region.
The SL node density is 0.01/m2. The DL nodes S and D
are located at the midpoint of the left and right edges
of the rectangle. The communication range over the
short-range RF link is r=29m. We generate 20 random
networks. For each network, simulations are repeated
in 500 rounds. In each round, unless stated otherwise,
we randomly choose 30% of the nodes to be malicious.
Each malicious node’s attack probability Pi is a random
value in the range of [0.2,0.8] where values are uniformly
distributed; once assigned, Pi is fixed throughout a round
of simulation. We obtain all possible paths from S and
D and randomly select some paths. Each node forwards
a packet to the next hop that is closer to D. We utilize
Q = 200 probe packets transmitted through each path5.
From experimental observations, we set the thresholds
η = 3.7 and ε = 0.0009.
To evaluate the proposed approaches, we evaluate the
detection accuracy and false alarm rate. The detection
accuracy is defined as: Pd = Number of correctly
identified malicious nodes / Number of malicious nodes.
5 S transmits 200 packets in one path and then switches to another path
to start the transmission.
The false alarm rate is defined as: Fa =Number of
benign nodes identified as malicious / Number of benign
nodes. All the results are measured and averaged based
on all simulation rounds over 20 random networks,
which are executed in Matlab.
Example 1: impact of the maximum number of hops.
In this example, we show the impact of the maximum
number of hops on Pd and Fa of HD and SD algorithms
with N=10 and 33 paths. Since each path may have
different number of hops, we denote the maximum
number of hops along a path as Np; that is, each path
selected for packet transmission has no more than Np
hops. Pd and Fa of HD and SD versus Np are plotted
in Fig. 6. One can observe that larger Np causes Pd to
decrease and Fa to increase. The reason is that, when
the percentage of malicious nodes is fixed, more hops
introduce higher uncertainty (the unknown Pi of each
malicious node) to the network. Hence, the number of
hops along a path should be limited.
Example 2: impact of network diversity. Here, we
examine the impact of network diversity on detection
accuracy with N=10. We limit the number of hops to
Np=6. Moreover, based on the selected 33 paths, we
randomly choose 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 100% of these
33 paths to be used for packet transmission, as shown in
Fig. 7. It can be demonstrated that when more paths are
used, the performance improves (Pd increases and Fa
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Figure 6: Pd and Fa as functions of maximum number of hops with 30% malicious nodes and 33 paths
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Figure 7: Pd and Fa as functions of number of paths with N=10, Np=6, 30% malicious nodes
decreases). The figure shows the performance of both
HD and SD. It can be seen that SD has high detection
accuracy than HD, at the expense of slightly higher false
alarm rate.
Example 3: Impact of percentage of malicious nodes.
In this example, we set N=10, Np=6 and examine the
impact of the percentages of the malicious nodes on
the performance of approaches. In Fig. 8, we plot
Pd and Fa as functions of percentage of malicious
nodes. As expected, Pd decreases as the percentage of
malicious nodes increases. This is because there are
fewer reliable paths. We also examine the performance
of SD Algorithm in the presence of channel errors,
where µ = 2%. By applying the reputation correction
described earlier, Fig. 8 demonstrates that the detection
accuracy of SD under channel errors is close to the case
without channel errors.
We also compare our algorithms with the conventional
watchdog scheme [7], which is a well-known technique
used for detecting packet manipulation attacks. In
the watchdog scheme, every node overhears packets
forwarded by neighboring nodes, and verifies whether
these packets were manipulated or not. Then, each
node reports its opinion about the trustworthiness of
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Figure 8: Pd and Fa as functions of percentage of malicious nodes with N=10, Np=6, 33 paths and µ=2%
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Figure 9: Pd and Fa as functions of percentage of malicious nodes with N=10, Np=6, and 33 paths
neighboring nodes to the destination. By collecting
reports from all nodes, the destination applies majority
voting to identify whether a node is malicious or not. We
use the same attack model described in Section 3.3 for
packet manipulation. Furthermore, compromised nodes
can report falsified information about their neighbors,
i.e., report malicious nodes as benign and benign nodes
as malicious, which is what we assumed here. It is
observed from Fig. 9 that, when the percentage of
malicious nodes is between 20% to 40%, our algorithms
achieve higher detection accuracy than the watchdog
scheme with slightly higher false alarm rate. In addition,
the false alarm rate of the watchdog scheme is higher
than that of our algorithms when the percentage of
malicious nodes exceeds 40%. It is worth mentioning
that the watchdog scheme would require extra energy,
computational and memory resources at each node
to overhear all their neighbors’ packets and evaluate
their trustworthiness. The computational burden in our
proposed approaches is moved from the simple SL nodes
to the more powerful DL nodes and/or LoRa gateways.
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Figure 10: Four types of topologies with 0, 1, 2 or 3 intermediate DL nodes
7.2 Performance Gains using Long-Range
Links
Consider a rectangular network area of (6N )×15m2,
with N = 30 SL nodes uniformly deployed (SL node
density is still 0.01/m2) and DL nodes R1 and R5
at the edge as shown in Fig. 10 (a)(b)(c)(d). We
examine the performance when there are none, one,
two, or three additional DL nodes in the area. That is,
we consider the scenarios where the whole network is
treated as a single region, or divided into two, three or
seven6 regions of smaller scales. Each neighboring DL
node acts as source/destination of probe packets in their
corresponding region(s). The source in each region uses
multiple paths to transmit packets to the destination in
the same region. In our experiments, we set the locations
of intermediate DL nodes such that the smaller-scale
regions are of almost the same size. In general, DL
nodes can be uniformly distributed. The LoRa RF link
communication range with low packet loss can be up to
5km [25]. That is, in each topology of Fig. 10, assuming
that the LoRa gateway is placed within 5km to each
DL node, DL nodes can communicate with each other
using LoRa RF links. Other settings are the same as the
previous subsection 7.
Example 4: impact of number of DL nodes. We
6 The seven regions in Fig. 10 (d) are shown clearly in Fig. 5.
7 To be consistent with to the previous subsection, the ratio between
the number of paths and the number of nodes per region is used here.
Hence, we set number of used paths to around 3.3 times the number
of SL nodes in the same region.
show the relationship between the detection accuracy
and the number of intermediate DL nodes in Fig. 11.
It is observed that the detection accuracy grows and
false alarm reduces when the number of intermediate
DL nodes increases. That is, utilizing more dual
links in the network architecture enables more accurate
identification of malicious nodes, and requires much
lower overhead compared to our previously proposed
methods, such as in [15][16].
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a novel hierarchical network
architecture design that utilizes dual communication link
technologies with distinct characteristics to facilitate
inference about the trustworthiness of network nodes.
The proposed network architecture is hierarchical, where
trusted DL nodes divide the large-scale network into
several small-scale network portions that are more
reliable and easier to manage. For each network portion,
we proposed to use unsupervised learning that exploits
the diversity of network paths to identify malicious nodes
launching packet manipulation attacks in a multihop
IoT network. We formulated nodes’ trustworthiness
metrics to cluster nodes according to their behavior.
Two algorithms were proposed: Hard Detection (HD)
and Soft Detection (SD). The HD algorithm clusters
nodes into benign and malicious groups. To further
consider the variability of attack probabilities, the SD
algorithm clusters nodes into three groups based on
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Figure 11: Pd and Fa as functions of number of intermediate DL nodes with 30 SL nodes, 30% malicious SL
nodes
their suspicious levels; then highly suspicious nodes
are removed and more accurate trustworthiness metrics
(contribution values) are calculated for the remaining
nodes provided sufficiently high network diversity. We
also analyzed the impact of channel errors on the
detection performance. Simulation results showed
that our malicious node identification techniques have
higher detection accuracy compared to the conventional
watchdog scheme. The gains increase as the percentage
of malicious nodes increases. It is observed that
increasing the density of DL nodes further improves
the detection accuracy since it enables more accurate
trustworthiness evaluation of the meshed SL nodes.
In this paper we assumed that DL nodes are reliable
and trusted. The problem becomes challenging if some
DL nodes are compromised. Also, in our approaches, we
randomly selected some routes from all possible paths to
transmit packets; choosing only few paths with specific
features could reduce the transmission overhead while
maintaining the detection accuracy. We are exploring
these issues as part of our ongoing work.
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